*psychological continuity theory of personal identity*:

(A is a person at one time, B is a person at a later time)

If B’s psychological states are inherited from A’s psychological states through a continuous chain, then A and B are numerically identical.

If B’s psychological states are not inherited from A’s psychological states through a continuous chain, then A and B are not numerically identical.

**Olson’s argument**

1. Either each adult human is numerically identical to some past fetus, or not.
2. If each adult human is numerically identical to some past fetus, then the psychological continuity view is false.
3. If each adult human is *not* numerically identical to some past fetus, then either human fetuses cease to exist when their cognitive abilities develop too much, or they continue to exist.
   1. If fetuses continue to exist after their cognitive capacities develop, then human people are not organisms.
   2. It’s not the case that human fetuses cease to exist when their cognitive abilities develop too much; this just isn’t plausible.
4. Why is (b) true?
5. Why, according to Olson, is (i) true?
6. Is it plausible that fetuses cease to exist when their cognitive abilities develop too much? Are there other sorts of being that cease to exist when (and because) they develop new abilities? Give some examples. Are there beings that do not? Give some examples. Which are more analogous to human fetuses?
7. As best you can, state Olson’s view of personal identity. Use the following template:

If [conditions] then A is identical to B.

If [those conditions are not met] then A is not identical to B.

1. Give a plausible counterexample to Olson’s view.